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We model and empirically estimate the relationship of ordinal scaled dependent variable: firm financing choice with 
business sophistication, revenue diversification and labor relationship using Indonesian data. We use controlling 
variables derived from Trade off Theory and Pecking Order Theory literature. We then elaborate the baseline model 
to include additional categoric variables of location and ownership, besides the interaction terms. The dataset is 
constructed from World Bank Enterprise Survey Year 2015 and Generalized logistic —partial proportional odds 
regression is employed as an estimator. We find that better business sophistication leads to greater acceptance to 
financing from outsiders and more diversified firms tend to prefer external financing. Finally, a better labor relationship 
corresponds to a greater preference for internal financing.
Keywords: Financing choice; business sophistication; revenue diversification; labor relationship.
ABSTRAK
Penyelidik memodelkan dan menganggarkan secara empirikal hubungan pemboleh ubah berskala ordinal: pilihan 
kewangan firma dengan kecanggihan perniagaan, kepelbagaian hasil dan hubungan buruh menggunakan data 
Indonesia. Pengkaji menggunakan pemboleh ubah kawalan yang diterbitkan daripada literatur Trade off Theory 
(TOT) dan Pecking Order Theory (POT). Pengkaji menghuraikan model asas untuk memasukkan pemboleh ubah 
kategori tambahan iaitu lokasi dan pemilikan serta beberapa istilah interaksi. Set data dibina daripada World Bank 
Enterprise Survey Year 2015 dan logistik umum – regresi ganjil berkadar separa telah digunakan sebagai penganggar. 
Pengkaji mendapati kecanggihan perniagaan yang lebih baik membawa kepada penerimaan yang lebih besar terhadap 
pembiayaan dari pihak luar dan firma yang lebih pelbagai cenderung memilih pembiayaan luaran. Akhir sekali, 
hubungan pekerja yang lebih baik sepadan dengan kecenderungan yang lebih besar kepada pembiayaan dalaman.
Kata kunci: Pilihan kewangan; kecanggihan perniagaan; kepelbagaian hasil; hubungan buruh. 
INTRODUCTION
Even though empirical literature on financing structure 
is abundant, academics and practitioners have yet to 
reach consensus on exactly how firms choose their 
financing method (An et al 2016; Denis & McKeon 
2012). The findings in this area are quite diverse, with a 
low to moderate robustness. It seems the result is highly 
context specific (Hang et al., 2018) - unsurprising, given 
the very wide spectrum of samples and methodologies 
in terms of firm size and characteristics, sectors, regions, 
and economies. This lack of consensus means the field 
is still wide open for new insights.
In this study, we investigate some qualitative 
aspects of firm financing choice, namely business 
sophistication, diversification, and labor relations, in 
addition to more-established variables hypothesized by 
the trade-off theory (TOT) and the pecking order theory 
(POT). A recent literature review by Fan et al (2011) 
emphasizes the role of the more qualitative aspects of 
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a firm’s financing choice.  The “soft aspect” of firm 
business influence the decision on a variety of channels 
like signaling bankruptcy protection, business risk 
diversification and employee entrenchment. To the best 
of our knowledge, empirical study on the role of these 
aspects to financial structure is still limited.     
We use data from the 2015 World Bank Enterprise 
Survey (WB-ES) for Indonesia, which had 1,320 
respondents from across the country. The questionnaire 
covered a range of key aspects in details; there are 
more than 250 questions, excluding control and 
general information. Several key aspects covered by 
the questions are finance, regulation, taxation, law 
enforcement, competition, innovation, land and permit, 
crime, and labor. As a member of G20, Indonesia is a large 
and important emerging market in the global economy. 
Nevertheless, publications on business environment 
comparisons (like those from Doing Business-World 
Bank or Competitiveness Report-World Economic 
Forum) rate the country at the lowest quartile. Among 
often-cited problems with business environment in 
Indonesia, and generally in Asia Pacific Countries (Abe 
et al, 2015) is financing. Businesses (especially Small 
Medium Enterprises; SME) still prioritize internal 
financing and/or find external financing generally 
difficult (Mahmud & Huda 2011).  This is an interesting 
result that spark our interest for further investigation. 
Specifically, we would like to know how financing 
decision of Indonesian enterprises are made. We agree 
with Fan et al (2011) assertion that qualitative aspects 
must have played an important role here.
We attempt to relate the WB-ES extensive 
information content to financing decision of business. 
TOT and POT are used as starting point of the study; 
they serve as qualitative basis choice of financing. 
Due to asymmetric information problem, the choice of 
financing would follow either as a trade-off between 
tax shield and cost of bankruptcy as in TOT (Kraus & 
Litzenberger 1973) or a preferred sequence as in POT 
(Myers & Majluf 1984). We model the dependent 
variable as an ordered response in which we transform 
original numeric financing structure data into ordinal 
type1. Initially we used ordered response regression 
(following Aitchison & Silvey 1957). Later, after we 
found violations on the proportional odds (also called 
parallel lines) assumption, we employed generalized 
ordered logistic regression (Williams 2016).
We elaborate on our analysis by including the 
effects of ownership (foreign versus domestic), location, 
and sectors both as a standalone impact and as an 
interaction factor. Who owns the company does matter 
to financing structure, although not conclusively (see 
Bandyopadhyay & Barua 2016; Quartey et al 2017). 
As outlined by Kayo and Kimura (2011), financing 
structure is influenced by firm-level characteristics as 
well as industry and country.
After this introduction, the paper proceeds as 
follows. In Section 2 (Literature Study), we present 
some relevant and recent theoretical and empirical 
studies on financing structure, which inform how we 
structure the research design. We then explain our 
methodology in Section 3, including the description of 
data, hypotheses, and econometric techniques used. In 
Section 4, we present estimation results along with the 
discussion, diagnostic, and robustness checks. Section 5 
summarizes the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature in modern capital structure can be traced 
back to Modigliani and Miller (1958), who hypothesized 
that capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. This 
proposition was obtained under strict assumptions of no 
taxes, no transaction costs, no asymmetric information, 
and no agency problem. Other early theoretical works 
on capital structure is the static trade-off theory 
proposed by Krauz and Litzenberger (1973), firms 
optimize on both direct and indirect trade-off distress 
costs (Haugen & Senbet 1978) and tax shield benefits. 
This theory postulates preference of firms using debt 
over equity for financing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
added the consideration of agency costs in making a 
trade-off. Subsequent study by Myers (1977) proposed 
the underinvestment hypothesis of leveraged firm 
managers forgoing positive-NPV projects. Using the 
same framework, Jensen (1986) put forth the free cash 
flow hypothesis: that debt exerts a disciplining effect on 
managers.
On the other hand, pecking order theory (POT, 
Myers & Majluf 1984) states that because of asymmetric 
information, there exists different valuation on different 
debt-equity instruments between insiders (managers 
and owners) and outsiders (investors). This valuation 
gap causes financing to be biased toward those who 
are the most informed (minimizing adverse selection). 
Hence there exists a sequence of financing from inside 
through retained earnings, then debt, and new equities 
as the last option.
Nevertheless, because of financial access constraints, 
small firms might depend more on credit provided by 
their suppliers than on bank loans. Corporate finance 
practices appear to be influenced mostly by firm size and 
to a lesser extent by shareholder orientation, whereas 
differences by country are weak at best (Brounen et 
al 2004; Drobetz et al 2006; Kayo & Kimura 2011). 
Fan et al. (2011) highlight several future directions 
for corporate finance research. They emphasize the 
role of more qualitative aspects of financing choice by 
firms. They also recognize a hierarchy of variables at 
the firm, industry, and country level and point out the 
rule of law, society characteristics, labor relationship, 
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market condition, ownership, business practices, 
and governance as important sources of variation in 
financing structure.
Vos et al (2007) study on UK SME revealed that 
business sophistication increase probability of firms to 
be more financially diversified. Margaritis and Psillaki 
(2010) find support for the efficiency risk hypotheses 
(suggested by Berger and Di Patti, 2006) Using a 
sample of French manufacturing firms. More-efficient 
firms are perceived to have lower bankruptcy cost, 
which lower their cost of debt. Business sophistication 
is also associated with production efficiency as found by 
Salas-Velasco (2018) on his study of corporates across 
OECD countries.
Ngah-Kiinglim et al. (2009), using panel data from 
245 Singaporean public firms, find a positive correlation 
between a firm’s product diversification strategy and its 
debt financing level. Akhtar and Oliver (2009) find that 
the degree of revenue exposure to external sources has 
a negative effect on leverage among Japanese firms. 
This phenomenon is hypothesized to result from risk 
management practices, wherein Japanese multinational 
corporations prefer using derivatives while domestic-
oriented firms prefer debt. Abe et al. (2015) conducted 
experts’ interview for SME financing determinants in 
Asia Pacific countries in which they concluded that 
diversification and bankruptcy law could improve the 
inclusion of firms to formal financing.  
Berk et al. (2010) developed a model of financing 
structure that incorporates the role of human capital, 
bankruptcy, and capital structure. They postulate that 
cost of bankruptcy is mostly borne by the employee (not 
the investor, as previous literature suggested). Their 
model produces following projections: (a) Employee 
risk aversion will negatively affect the leverage ratio, 
(b) highly leveraged firms have to pay a premium to 
hire employees, (c) capital-intensive firms will choose 
higher leverage, and (d) riskier firms will choose lower 
leverage. 
The role of employees in financing structure could 
also manifest in terms of strategic negotiation. Matsa 
(2010) developed and tested a model with US firm 
data in which he finds evidence that firms deliberately 
choose high leverage to improve their bargaining power 
with labor unions. Stronger labor ownership might pose 
a negative impact to financial performance including 
aversion to outside financing (Guedri & Hollandts 
2008; O’Boyle et al. 2016). Nevertheless, the net impact 
remains inconclusive as higher bonding might also 
increase motivation and effort (Matsa 2018).  
In recent empirical literature, tangible asset, size, 
growth, profitability and valuation are several most 
commonly cited conventional factors to influence 
capital structure (Fan et al. 2011; Fan et al. 2012; Bhaird 
& Lucey 2014; Hang et al. 2018). Higher tangible asset 
ownership, company’s growth and size are positively 
correlated to leverage; while profitability and valuation 
impact to leverage is negative. These findings shown 
that the empirical body of knowledge have elements of 
both TOT and POT. 
Company age impact to leverage could be positive 
as found by Forte et al. (2013), Borgia and Newman 
(2012) and Quartey et al. (2017) or negative (found by 
Bhaird & Lucey 2014; Kieschnick & Moussawi 2018). 
Fan et al. (2012) cross country study found the significant 
positive role of tax rate and bankruptcy cost to external 
financing. Bankruptcy cost could be proxied by asset 
riskiness; Forte et al. (2013) study based on Brazilian 
firms found that it negatively correlated with external 
financing. Foreign ownership impact to leverage is 
context dependent. Phung and Ley (2013) and Quartey 
et al. (2017) studies found that foreign ownership to 
be negatively affect leverage. On the other hand, Li et 
al. (2009), Margaritis and Psillaki (2010), Gurunlu and 
Gursoy (2010) and Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016) 
found this relationship to be negative.  
In Indonesia context, Machmud and Huda (2011) 
conducted an interesting survey on SMSE’s financing 
and found almost equal portion of firms that have access 
to finance (56%) and those which don’t have it (44%). Of 
those which have financial access; mostly (96%) opted 
to rely on internal financing due to culture or traditional 
way of doing business. For those firms who don’t have 
financial access usually caused by high transaction cost, 
insufficient collateral and lack of business skills (ie. 
producing financial reports and busines plan). Moosa 
and Li (2012) based on cross section study of public 
companies found the order of importance of liquidity, 
size, profitability, tangibility and income variability 
to capital structure (leverage ratio). Haroon (2018) 
also found the role of liquidity, profitability, age and 
ownership to leverage.        
METHODOLOGY
We model the estimated relationship using a linear form 
as follows:
( )* ; 0i i iY X u E uβ= + =                  (1)
in which the cutoff the latent variable for category j of 
dependent variable *
iY  is given by
*1; i i iY Y τ= −∞ < <
*
1;   2, , 1i j i jY j Y j mτ τ−= < < = … −
*; i m iY m Yτ= < < ∞                      (2)
where Y is the financing structure, an ordinal variable2, 
and X is the vector of regressors.
We are trying to cover a substantial portion of 
rich information provided by the dataset. To do so, 
we combine various items in questionnaire into three 
metrics: a measure of firm sophistication (SOPHIST), a 
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measure of firm revenue diversification (DIVERS), and 
a measure of labor relationship quality (LABREL). The 
definition, symbol, details of construction, and expected 
sign hypotheses for each variable appear in Table 1.
To start, we use an ordered logistic estimation 
technique. Then we test the proportional odds 
assumption using the Brant test. Williams (2016) 
showed that violations of the parallel lines assumption 
could result not only in a loss of efficiency but even in 
a bias of estimates. Long and Freese (2014) suggested 
that in this assumption is often violated in practice. 
Should such violations happen, we will then use the 
generalized ordered logistic technique as proposed by 
Williams (2016). In this study, we use a variant of the 
generalized logit model, which allows some variables to 
have the same logit coefficients (called beta coefficients) 
while others do not (called gamma coefficients). This 
approach is called the partial proportional odds (PPO) 
model. An illustration for a model with M categories 
and three regressors in which the third variable (X3) 
is relaxed from the assumption is given as follows 
(Williams 2016):
( ) ( )( )
1 1 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 2 3 3
exp
 , 1, 2, , 1
1 exp
j i i i j
i
j i i i j
X X X
P Y j j M
X X X
α β β β
α β β β
+ + +
> = = … −
+ + + +
( ) ( )( )
1 1 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 2 3 3
exp
 , 1, 2, , 1
1 exp
j i i i j
i
j i i i j
X X X
P Y j j M
X X X
α β β β
α β β β
+ + +
> = = … −
+ + + +
(3)
We extend our basic model to include foreign ownership 
(FORJV), classification of the city (CITY) and province 
(PROV) in which a firm resides, and the sector in which 
a firm receives the majority of its revenue (SECTOR)3. 
In addition to the parallel assumption test on the 
final model, we also conduct robustness checks through 
sequential inclusion on variables of interest (SOPHIST, 
DIVERS, and LABREL). We want to see whether each 
of these variables will affect the estimation results. We 
use the World Bank Enterprise Survey Year 2015 dataset 
for Indonesia. We review for data defect: improper 
responses and outliers before using it for estimation. 
We had 1,320 observations to begin with. In the next 
section after data screening, we eventually worked with 
774 observations.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the process of estimation 
and the estimation results. First, we present descriptive 
statistics and notes on the data process. Next, we 
present the estimation results and a brief discussion 
of the key findings. Finally, we present our diagnostic 
check to gauge the robustness of the findings. Here, we 
use statistical cut-off point of p value at 5% at most to 
indicate significance of variables. 
TABLE 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Obs
FIN_CHOICE 1.401 1.000 3.000 1.000 0.749 774
SIZE 2.009 2.000 3.000 1.000 0.789 774
PL_OWN 86.017 100.000 100.000 0.000 31.728 774
SALES_G 0.132 (0.001) 27.889 (1.000) 1.739 774
TOBIN_Q 4.580 1.333 275.000 0.007 18.921 774
TAX_INSPECT 1.923 2.000 5.000 1.000 0.979 774
BURDEN 0.175 (0.611) 16.143 (1.327) 1.839 774
YEAR_OPS 21.428 19.000 95.000 2.000 11.032 774
SOPHIST 2.363 2.000 8.000 0.000 2.081 774
DIVERS 0.067 (0.852) 6.800 (0.852) 1.604 774
LAB_REL 0.478 0.525 8.980 (5.412) 1.623 774
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study. We start with 1,320 observations and then exclude observations 
based on the following qualifications: tallies on financing choice, zero sales, zero book value of machine and land, winsorizing 1% of sales 
growth, and Tobin_Q. After filtering out the foregoing observations, we have 774 observations to be analyzed. The lower part is number of 
cases in each category of dependent and explanatory variables.
#Cases of Categorical Variables
FIN PRTY SIZE CAT CITY D FORJV SECTOR
Category #Cases Category #Cases Category #Cases Category #Cases Category #Cases
1 588 1 237 1 64 1 88 1 327
2 62 2 293 2 209 0 686 0 447
3 124 3 244 3 501
Sum 774 774 774 774 774
JEM 54(3).indd   105 15/2/2021   1:32:54 PM
106 Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 54(3)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the estimation. After the filtering process, it looks 
like the data are reasonably well behaved. Except for 
TAX_INSPECT, all variables have 774 observations. 
The correlations, shown in Table 3, indicate that a 
somewhat high correlation exists between variables 
SIZE and SOPHIST (0.561). Nevertheless, we find that 
overall bivariate correlation structure is quite acceptable.
REGRESSION RESULTS
As explained earlier, we first perform ordered logistic 
regression. The results show that the parallel line 
assumption has been violated based on the Brant test. 
As Table 4 shows, the Brant test chi squares are 19.35 
and 16.96 for Model A and Model B, respectively, both 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, at least 
one of the regressors must have a different coefficient 
for different category equation.
Because ordered logistic is not the correct method 
to use, we then proceed to generalized ordered 
logistic regression. To preserve parsimony, we 
impose coefficient restrictions on variables in which 
proportional assumptions hold (verified by a Wald test); 
this is the PPO model. For these variables, we could use 
the same coefficients for each values of j category, called 
TABLE 3. Correlation Table
FIN_CHOICE SIZE PL_OWN SALES_G TOBIN_Q TAX_INSPECT YEAR_OPS BURDEN SOHPIST DIVERS LAB_REL
FIN_CHOICE 1.000             
SIZE 0.018             1.000  
PL_OWN (0.114)           (0.140) 1.000      
SALES_G (0.007)           (0.114) 0.062      1.000      
TOBIN_Q (0.052)           0.030  0.066      (0.023)     1.000      
TAX_INSPECT 0.042             0.241  (0.007)    0.069      (0.061)     1.000               
YEAR_OPS 0.032             0.178  0.133      0.048      0.098      0.071               1.000         
BURDEN 0.141             0.340  (0.130)    (0.004)     0.225      0.024               0.243         1.000     
SOHPIST 0.244             0.561  (0.112)    0.077      0.174      0.085               0.331         0.414     1.000      
DIVERS 0.253             0.283  (0.095)    0.100      0.002      (0.074)             0.146         0.162     0.303      1.000    
LAB_REL (0.162)           (0.110) 0.078      0.119      (0.153)     0.078               0.142         0.019     0.006      (0.018)   1.000       
Note: This table reports matrix of correlation (Pearson correlation) between dependent variables and (non-categoric) explanatory variables. The 
calculation is based on 774 observations.
TABLE 5. Baseline PPO Regressions
Coefficient
Coef. P_val Coef. P_val
Beta
SIZE 0.526*** 0.002 0.503*** 0.003
PL_OWN -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000
SALES_G 0.056 0.162
TOBIN_Q 0.007** 0.050
BURDEN 0.007 0.880 0.006 0.904
YEAR_OPS 0.000 0.986 0.000 0.972
SOPHIST 0.100* 0.090 0.111* 0.059
DIVERS 0.198*** 0.000 0.198*** 0.000
LAB_REL -0.248*** 0.000 -0.242*** 0.000
Gamma
TOBIN_Q -0.011** 0.037
SOPHIST -0.105** 0.013 -0.119*** 0.005
Pseudo R2 0.130 0.137
χ2  Model 124.89*** 0.000 126.04*** 0.000
χ2 Prop. Assumption 8.070 0.326 4.990 0.545
Negative Pred. Prob 0.000 0.000
Model 1 Model 2
Note: This table reports the result of PPO regression with dependent 
variable FIN_CHOICE, complemented by tests on parallel 
assumption (Wald test) and specification (in sample cases 
of negative predicted probability). *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
TABLE 4. Ordered Logistic Regression Estimation and Brant 
Test
Coefficient
Coef. P_val Coef. P_val
SIZE 1.196*** 0.005 1.108*** 0.006
PL_OWN -0.011* 0.086 -0.010 0.136
SALES_G 0.033 0.662
TOBIN_Q -0.038 0.329
TAX_INSPECT -0.005 0.976 -0.025 0.876
BURDEN 0.054 0.338 0.082 0.159
YEAR_OPS -0.006 0.735 -0.005 0.771
SOPHIST 0.164* 0.097 0.190** 0.050
DIVERS 0.188*** 0.010 0.184*** 0.013
LAB_REL -0.166** 0.042 -0.191** 0.019
Pseudo R2 0.123 0.129
χ2  Model 43.78*** 0.000 48.78*** 0.000
χ2 Brant Test 19.35** 0.022 16.96** 0.049
Model A Model B
Note: This table reports the result of ordered logistic regression 
and test on the parallel line assumption (Brant test) with 
dependent variable FIN_CHOICE. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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beta. The test and estimation are worked like a stepwise 
regression using an autofit mechanism (Williams, 
2006). We report here only that the chosen model no 
longer has a parallel line violation issue. Variables in 
which assumptions are not required to hold could have 
separate effect coefficients (called gamma). In addition 
to testing for the proportional odds assumption, we also 
test for proper specification. Williams (2016) states 
that a proper PPO model should not produce negative 
probability in sample cases4.
As Table 5 illustrates, we find strong empirical 
support for our variables of interest: Business 
Sophistication, Revenue Diversification, and Labor 
Relationship. The coefficients for Business 
Sophistication are all positive (in the range of 0.100 
to 0.111) but barely statistically significant (at the 
10% level). Hence it seems that more-sophisticated 
enterprises tend to use greater leverage. More 
sophisticated business entities have better transparency 
and risk management hence would be more willing 
to accept outside financing. These findings are also 
confirmed by Fan et al. (2011) and Quartey et al. 
(2017).
Revenue Diversification is also positively correlated 
with financing choice in all model specifications 
(coefficient of 0.198, significant at the 1% level). Firms 
that have more-diversified revenue are more willing to 
accept financing from outsiders (i.e., creditors). Hang 
et al (2018), Bhaird and Lucey (2010), and Quartey et 
al. (2017) all find similar results. Aligned with these 
studies, we find diversification could be associated with 
more profit and less risk business, which subsequently 
linked with greater propensity in taking leverage.
The quality of the labor relationship seems to 
exert adverse influence on leverage. The coefficients 
are negative (in the range of –0.248 to –0.242) and 
statistically significant (at the 1% level). Our findings 
confirm the theoretical projection of Berk, Stanton, 
and Zechner (2010), in which labor-intensive firms are 
associated with low leverage. Higher bonding of labor to 
the firm will exert risk averse attitude in part of the labor 
that affect managerial financing decision. It might also 
TABLE 6. Extended PPO Regressions with SALES_G as a Proxy for Profitability
Coefficient
Coef. p val Coef. p val Coef. p val Coef. p val
Beta
SIZE 0.521*** 0.002 0.531*** 0.002 0.544*** 0.001 0.505*** 0.003
PL_OWN -0.018*** 0.000 -0.019*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000
SALES_G 0.051 0.200 0.052 0.198 0.048 0.235 0.056 0.169
BURDEN -0.001 0.991 0.029 0.545 0.004 0.935 0.009 0.852
YEAR_OPS 0.001 0.953 0.001 0.875 -0.001 0.950 0.000 0.974
SOPHIST 0.104* 0.076 0.150** 0.014 0.086 0.146 0.092 0.122
DIVERS 0.197*** 0.000 0.208*** 0.000 0.207*** 0.000 0.199*** 0.000






SOPHIST -0.114*** 0.004 -0.107** 0.013 -0.107** 0.012 -0.105*** 0.013
CITY 0.417*** 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.144 0.138 0.134 0.131
χ2  Model 133.85*** 0.000 129.8*** 0.000 130.66*** 0.000 127.3*** 0.000
χ2 Prop. Assumption 14.97** 0.036 12.990 0.112 9.710 0.286 10.050 0.262
Negative Pred. Prob 0 0 0 0
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6Model 3
Note: This table reports the result of Extended PPO regression with dependent variable: FIN_CHOICE and Categoric Variables: CITY, FORJV, 
PROV and SECTOR. SALES_G is used as the profitability proxy. The results are complemented with tests on parallel assumption (Wald 
test) and specification, in sample cases of negative predicted probability. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
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support Matsa’s (2010) bargaining hypotheses, which 
suggests that firms use leverage, rather than labor, to 
improve their strategic position.
Size of the firm appears to have a positive effect on 
the odds proportion of taking financing from outsiders 
(banks and NBFIs, suppliers, or other sources). This 
finding supports the TOT hypothesis and is consistent 
with Kayo and Kimura (2011), Quartey et al. (2017), 
Fan et al. (2012), and Hang et al. (2018). Larger firm 
(hence larger revenue); ceteris paribus, means greater 
tax saving could be obtained from using leverage. 
Nevertheless, it seems that a higher percentage of 
tangible asset ownership exerts an inward tendency 
on the firm’s financing choice. Higher percentage of 
property owned by the firm exerts a negative and highly 
significant impact to leverage. Therefore, our finding 
also supports the POT hypothesis: greater tangible assets 
means more private value that results in less incentive to 
get external financing. Bhaird and Lucey (2010), Forte 
et al. (2014), and Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016) are 
studies that find similar results.
The influence of profitability if measured by sales 
growth is positive but not statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, if we use Tobin’s Q, we find a positive 
and significant (at the 5% level) coefficient. This 
finding supports the TOT hypothesis and is aligned 
with empirical evidence by Graham and Harvey 
(2001), Bhaird and Lucey (2014), and Forte, Barros, 
and Nakamura (2014). We find no supporting evidence 
from bankruptcy and years of operation proxies. The 
coefficients are not statistically significant.
There are two variables for which the proportional 
odds assumption does not hold: TOBIN_Q (Model 1) 
and Business Sophistication (Models 1 and 2). Note that 
these gammas are the coefficients of respective variables 
in regressions for dependent variable: Financing choice 
of odds ratio using Retained earnings (category 1) and 
Loan from Banks and NBFIs (category 2) versus Other 
(category 3). Because the dependent variable has only 
three categories, they can be thought of as the (algebraic) 
sign inverse probability of other type of financing versus 
retained earnings and loans from bank and NBFIs.
TABLE 7. Extended PPO Regressions with TOBIN_Q as a Proxy of Profitability
Coefficient
Coef. p val Coef. p val Coef. p val Coef. p val
Beta
SIZE 0.505*** 0.003 0.510*** 0.003 0.531*** 0.002 0.481*** 0.004
PL_OWN -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000
TOBIN_Q 0.003 0.253 0.007* 0.058 0.007** 0.036 0.007* 0.054
BURDEN 0.000 0.999 0.028 0.563 0.002 0.961 0.007 0.879
YEAR_OPS 0.000 0.958 0.001 0.899 -0.001 0.923 0.000 0.964
SOPHIST 0.112** 0.056 0.160*** 0.009 0.094 0.108 0.104* 0.081
DIVERS 0.196*** 0.000 0.208*** 0.000 0.207*** 0.000 0.199*** 0.000






TOBIN_Q -0.011** 0.039 -0.011** 0.034 -0.011** 0.037
SOPHIST -0.114*** 0.004 -0.121*** 0.004 -0.121** 0.004 -0.119*** 0.004
CITY 0.421*** 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.143 0.144 0.141 0.138
χ2  Model 136.330*** 0.000 130.200*** 0.000 133.120*** 0.000 128.550*** 0.000
χ2 Prop. Assumption 14.460** 0.044 9.100 0.245 7.320 0.397 8.410 0.298
Negative Pred. Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10Model 7
Note: This table reports the result of Extended PPO regression with dependent variable: FIN_CHOICE and categoric variables: CITY, FORJV, 
PROV, and SECTOR. TOBIN_Q is used as the profitability proxy. The results are complemented with tests on parallel assumption (Wald 
test) and the specification test: in sample cases of negative predicted probability. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively.
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The TOBIN_Q gamma coefficient is negative: 
0.011 and statistically significant in Model 1. It means 
that the higher TOBIN_Q, the higher the probability of 
using another type of financing (in the “other type of 
financing” odds regression). The gamma coefficients of 
Business Sophistication are all negative in the range of 
–0.119 to –0.105 (and statistically significant), which 
means the odds of using other type of financing is 
greater the higher Business Sophistication (in other type 
of financing odds regression).
We extend our baseline model by including 
categoric variables: City Category, Ownership (Foreign-
Joint Venture versus Domestic), Province Category, 
and Economic Sector Category. We first estimate 
using Sales Growth as a profitability proxy; Table 6 
presents the results. Of the four additional categoric 
variables, only Ownership and Province Category have 
statistically significant coefficients. Interestingly, we 
find a large negative magnitude effect of foreign-Joint 
Venture dummy ownership (FORJV). The coefficient 
is –0.855 and highly significant (at the 1% level). This 
finding shows a strong tendency among foreign-JV 
firms for using retained earnings compared with other 
financing types. This finding is similar to Li et al. (2009), 
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010), and Gurunlu and Gursoy 
(2010). It could be that foreign-joint venture entities 
have more private information, or they have limited 
need of funds due to financing facilities provided by the 
parent company (or their foreign partner). Other studies 
produce different results, indicating that foreign firms 
tend to be more open to outsiders (Phung & Ley 2013; 
Quartey et al. 2017). 
The coefficient of Province Category is also 
negative (–0.365) and significant (at the 5% level). This 
result offers evidence that firms located in Java and 
Sumatra are more conservative in terms of financing. 
They prefer using retained earnings to outside financing 
and we suspect that it might be cultural related factors. 
Categoric variables: City and Economic Sector are not 
significant. We can see also that PPO regression on City 
category suffers from proportional odds assumption 
violation.
We obtain a qualitatively similar finding when we 
change the profitability proxy from Sales Growth to 
TOBIN_Q. From four additional categoric variables, 
again, only Ownership and Province Category 
coefficients are statistically significant. Here we find the 
coefficients to be –0.855 and –0.387 for Foreign-Joint 
Venture and Province Category, respectively.
Finally, we extend the analysis further by 
incorporating interaction variables. We are interested 
in possible interaction of firm size, ownership, and 
province category with our variables of interest: 
Business Sophistication, Revenue Diversification, and 
TABLE 10. Robustness Check: Limited Model
Coefficient
Coef. p val Coef. p val Coef. p val Coef. p val Coef. p val
Beta
SOPHIST 0.145*** 0.001 0.082*** 0.001 0.170*** 0.000
DIVERS 0.242*** 0.000 0.145*** 0.000 0.245*** 0.000
LAB_REL -0.251*** 0.000 -0.150*** 0.000 -0.253*** 0.000
Eq1
SOPHIST 0.170*** 0.000 0.104*** 0.000
DIVERS 0.250*** 0.000 0.147*** 0.000
LAB_REL -0.258*** 0.000 -0.154*** 0.000
Eq2
SOPHIST 0.055 0.290 0.034 0.270
DIVERS 0.244*** 0.000 0.141*** 0.000
LAB_REL -0.237*** 0.000 -0.140*** 0.000
Gamma
SOPHIST -0.115*** 0.004
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.062 0.072 0.072
χ2  Model 73.130*** 0.000 73.320*** 0.000 78.560*** 0.000 82.030*** 0.000 78.480*** 0.000
χ2 Prop. Assumption 0.480 0.788
Negative Pred. Prob 0
Ordered Logit Ordered Probit Generalized Logit Generalized Probit PPO
Note: This table reports the results of several regressions methods of FIN_CHOICE only on variables of interest: SOPHIST, DIVERS, and 
LAB_REL. Regression methods used are ordered logit, ordered probit, generalized logit, generalized probit, and PPO. The results are 
complemented with tests on parallel assumption (Wald test) and specification test: in sample cases of negative predicted probability. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Labor Relationship. Because of limitations in degrees 
of freedom (especially at the categorical level), we 
estimate only a partial interaction effect (subsequentially 
included). There are 18 interaction coefficients 
estimated from each profitability proxy: Sales Growth 
and TOBIN_Q.
Table 8 and Table 9 present the result of extended 
model, in which we included the interaction variables 
for each profitability proxy. From 18 coefficients 
of interaction terms, we find only three that are 
statistically significant and of acceptable specification. 
The coefficients are FORJV*SOPHIST (Model 13); 
coefficient = –0.154 (significant at the 1% level), 
FORJV*SOPHIST (Model 23); coefficient = –0.154 
(significant at the 1% level) and PROV*SOPHIST 
(Model 26); coefficient = –0.067 (significant at the 10% 
level). Other interaction terms are either not statistically 
significant, have negative probability in sample cases, or 
both. Based on these findings, qualitatively we conclude 
that the interaction terms might not play an important 
role in determining financing choice.
ROBUSTNESS CHECK
We conducted two types of robustness checks, aiming 
to verify the statistical importance of our variable of 
interest. The first is by regressing Financing Choice to 
our variables of interest only, called a limited model. 
Here we employ five estimation techniques: ordered 
logit, ordered probit, generalized logit, generalized 
probit, and PPO. The second check is by sequentially 
inserting our variables of interest to the regression. No 
algebraic sign or substantial numerical changes were 
considered as a support of robustness to our findings. 
We conduct our robustness check only to the baseline 
regression (Table 5).
Table 10 presents the result of limited model 
estimation. Here we can see that quantitively, none 
our variables of interest deviate from the baseline 
regressions, either in algebraic sign or numerical size. We 
find a similar qualitative conclusion when performing the 
second robustness check (see Table 11 below).
CONCLUSION
In this study, we estimate the relationship of financing 
choice with various regressors. Specifically, we 
want to see how our variables of interest (Business 
Sophistication, Revenue Diversification, and Labor 
Relationship) affect Financing Choice. We also include 
variables from established theories, notably TOT and 
POT: Firm Size, Percentage of Property Owned by 
the Firm, Tax Burden, Profitability and Probability of 
Bankruptcy. We then go further and include additional 
categoric variables: City, Ownership and Province, as 
well as some interaction terms.
As a straightforward application of financing 
structure theories, we employ ordinal response logistic 
regression. Upon testing and reviewing variables and 
data, we find that a variant of generalized logistic 
regression—partial proportional odds regression, 
introduced by Williams (2016)—is preferred over 
standard ordered logistic jekoregression
We find the following important insights from 
estimation. First, business sophistication is positively 
correlated with financing choice. The better a firm’s 
business sophistication, the more willing the firm will 
be to accept financing from outsiders. Second, revenue 
diversification is positively associated with financing 
choice. On average, a more diversified firm tends to prefer 
external financing. Third, quality of labor relationship 
has negative effect on external financing. A better labor 
relationship corresponds to a greater preference for 
internal financing. Fourth, findings in support of trade-
off theory are the positive and significant coefficients of 
SIZE and TOBIN_Q. On the other hand, the negative 
and significant coefficient of PL_OWN supports POT. 
Fifth, foreign ownership and province location both have 
a negative influence on financing choice. Foreign firms 
and firms located in Java and Sumatra prefer internal 
financing. Lastly, there seems to be a weak effect from 
interaction between SIZE, FORJV, and PROV with 
variables of interest to financing choice.
The above key insights show that a better business 
sophistication and greater revenue diversification tend 
to make firms to be open to outside financing. Outside 
financing in turn would bring better corporate governance 
as a disciplining device to management (Brealey et 
al, 2017). Better corporate governance will improve 
transparency and credit information spur innovation 
and eventually economic growth itself (Allen & Gale 
1999). Therefore, regulator should play an active role 
in encouraging adoption of modern business practices 
by firms. Especially due to current advancement; many 
technologies are cheap to adopt.
A concern should be in place since we find a 
negative effect of better labor relationship on external 
funding. It perhaps signaling an entrenched attitude of 
employee that might potentially lead for unfavorable 
outcome like non optimal financial performance (Guedri 
& Hollandts 2008; O’Boyle et al. 2016). On the other 
hand, this finding could also be interpreted as heightened 
ownership of employee which can also be beneficial 
(Matsa 2018). Therefore, this issue perhaps should be 
approached cautiously by practitioner and regulator 
alike. The role of labor relationship to simultaneously 
financing and performance is open to further study.
Our study provides evidence of the role of business 
sophistication, revenue diversification and quality 
of labor to financial choice of the firms. Since World 
Bank Enterprise Survey also provides database for 40 
other countries and some of them are of panel structure; 
therefore, it could be avenues for future research. We 
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also recommend using the econometric method: PPO as 
it has relaxed and more realistic assumption to use.
NOTES
1 There are two types of capital financing structure 
(in percentage of capital expense) in the dataset: (a) 
working capital and (b) capital expenditure. Further 
investigation of the dataset shows, however, that 
using capital expenditure would not yield reliable 
estimates because of the small degrees of freedom 
(only 84 valid responses). Therefore, we rely only on 
the working capital structure and hence use the term 
“financing structure” rather than capital structure.
2 In defining financing priority, we used working 
capital only because of adequacy of sample. We 
grouped the percentage of financing by three 
categories: retained earnings, loan by banks and 
non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), and other 
sources. Then we assigned an ordinal number to 
indicate the most-used type of financing: 1 if the 
financing is obtained mostly from retained earnings, 
2 if from loans provided by banks and/or NBFIs, 
and 3 if from other sources.
3 We modify the definition of variables from the 
original (WB Survey) to increase our degrees of 
freedom. CITY is simplified to three categories (from 
four in World Bank) by merging the category of city 
population of 50,000 into the 250,000-population 
category. PROV is simplified into two categories 
(Java or Sumatra) from the original 10. Java and 
Sumatra are Indonesia’s most populated islands 
and are growth centers within the nation. SECTOR 
is simplified into two categories: sectors that we 
perceive as capital intensive (SECTOR=1) versus 
non-capital intensive (SECTOR=0). Originally this 
variable had nine categories.
4 Unfortunately, after performing estimation and 
testing, it turned out that TAXINSPECT is no longer 
viable. Every PPO estimation that includes this 
variable suffers from negative predicted probability 
in sample cases. Therefore, we conclude that we 
should remove this variable.
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